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Taking Humanism Seriously: 
Science and Rhetoric in the 
Postmodern World 
Edmund E. Jacobitti 
1. THE SCIENTIFIC AND THE RHETORICAL PARADIGM 
By the scientific perspective, I mean our traditional logocentric 
belief in a discoverable, objective reality existing independent of 
the observer. By humanism, I mean a contrary notion, an im-
manentist orientation that regards fixed compass points, divine 
or natural, as but temporary conventions. And by postmodern I 
mean "incredulity toward metanarratives," as Lyotard put it. 1 A 
humanist orientation could not, in short, exist outside a post-
modern world. The only real question today is, can we continue 
to exist in a postmodern world? Can Man alone rebuild his city 
or must we degenerate into a barbarism where life will be so 
solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish, that we shall rejoice that it is 
also short? It is an open question; but we are where we are and 
must do with what we have. 
First, postmodern humanism rejects the equation of reason 
with mere "logic." "Logic" is incompatible with a life we now 
know to be illogical. A priori theory works only in a world fixed 
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by inviolable laws, that is, in a theoretical if not actually imaginary 
world. A priori logic is a Euclidean game whose players do not 
know it is a game. It works flawlessly only so long as it does not 
encounter the a posteriori. The a posteriori, on the other hand, 
though tied to reality, depends on the empirical world retaining 
its shape long enough for the induced rules to be useful. This 
may be true of empirical facts like the color of gold or the boiling 
point of water; but is it true of important issues, of political issues? 
Likewise, Aufhebung fails for it depends on mere faith, on forgetting 
the real world; it depends on not reading the newspapers. Practice, 
in the view of Aufhebung, is simply along for the ride. Because of 
these liabilities, humanist reason abandons all "logics" that rest 
on "predictability" and a fixed idea of the "true." In place of 
theory, postmodern humanism puts practice. 
Second, we are wary of the idea of the "true" because it inevit-
ably leads to a condemnation of man's own work; and that work 
is all we have. The idea of the "true" leads to the idea that to see 
"clearly and distinctly" we must set aside our work, our own man-
made values ("prejudices," "biases," and other historical debris) 
in order to be worthy of a transparent vision of the "true." In other 
words, where Descartes despaired that "so long as I gave thought 
only to the manners and customs of men, I met with nothing to 
reassure me," 2 the postmodern humanist accepts that there is, in 
fact, nothing but the "manners and customs of men." The "presup-
positionless" posture is a will o' the wisp. We must begin with 
what we have and not really make orphans of ourselves. 
The dangers, of course, of this relativism, of simply accepting 
our local inheritance, are obvious and have been the central prob-
lem of philosophy since the ancients. But postmodern humanism 
is not a salute to Thrasymachus; it is simply tired of tail-chasing. 
Instead of lamenting our eviction from the garden, humanism 
proposes that we build our own civitas. Instead of lamenting the 
loss of the "true," humanism condemns the effort to purge "bias" 
from our souls. Ecrasez l'infame has come to mean eradicating not 
only the infamous and the absurd, but all "merely" human values. 
In place of courage, honor, the local, we put the "impartial," the 
"neutral," and the "objective." We strive to make ourselves value-
free, "moraline free," as Nietzsche said. In short, in our quest for 
the "true," we dehumanize ourselves; for every value is subjected 
to the reductio ad Hitlerium by the defenders of" objectivity." Nothing 
can be despised-except not being "objective." "Alas, the time of 
the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to 
despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. "3 For the "last 
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man," any action, any thought, is "bias." Somnambulism mas-
querades as virtuous "objectivity." In fact, however, it is when 
we are free of all our so-called superficial, historical, cultural, etc., 
"biases," that we become morally dead, decadent, unable without 
those "biases" to recognize Hitler and Stalin. 
"It is my contention," said Nietzsche, "that all the values in 
which mankind now sums up its supreme desiderata are decadence 
values . ... It is my contention that all the supreme values of man-
kind ... which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are 
lording it under the holiest names." 4 And what are the "holiest 
names" if not "objectivity," "tolerance," "neutrality," and so on? 
Conservative (and pessimistic) European thinkers like Leo 
Strauss, Eric Voegelin, radicals like Georges Sorel, Benedetto 
Croce, Hannah Arendt, Russians (a separate category, I guess) 
like Solzhenitsyn, Doestoevsky, and countless others 5-whatever 
one may make of their solutions-all have pointed an accusing 
finger at the futility of trying to wage a moral struggle against totali-
tarianism from a morally neutral point of view. If knowing the 
world requires jumping out of our morality, how are we to act 
and judge that world? "For what is a man profitted, if he gain 
the whole world, and lose his own soul?" 
The value of postmodern humanism is that it rejects objectiv-
ity and soporific "logic" and, with these narcotics gone, it opens 
the way to a conscious recovery of defensible moral values and a 
positive conception of life. 
Here I shall argue, first, that such a positive conception may 
be made through a recovery of the rhetorical tradition. Second, 
that science, far from being a search for the "true," is also a form 
of rhetoric. And lastly, that, though the unvarnished truth of the 
matter is that all wisdom is rhetorical, rhetoric is not free construc-
tion. It is checked by history, the rhetoric of other cultures and 
individuals, and, in science, by nature. 
The illusion that we can only pursue the "true" if we adopt 
a passive and "neutral" point of view has made us blind to rhetoric, 
made us see rhetoric as "mere rhetoric," the smoke and fumes 
that obscure the "true." If logic has led to decadence, impotence, 
and nihilism, then rhetoric, which is wisdom based in the real 
world of historical practice, may lead us back to concrete and 
practical considerations. On the other hand, a rhetoric checked 
by experience and the views of the other may also help us avoid 
some of the Neanderthal tendencies of antimodernism. In short, 
we will have to walk a fine line between the siren of Modernity 
and the primitive. 
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By rhetoric, I mean wisdom that is committed rather than 
neutral, rooted in flexible common sense rather than in abstract 
logos and that unconsciously (or even better, consciously-if that 
ever be possible) shapes reality as opposed to merely discovering it. 
Rhetoric may operate at two levels. On the one hand, it must 
first be rooted in the present situation and common sense. It acts 
with purpose and attributes purpose to the actions of others. It 
does not seek absolute proof or truth before it acts because it 
knows absolute proof is unavailable. At the same time, rhetoric 
may also operate at a deeper and more self-conscious level, a level 
where we know that truth is created and not discovered. 
Science, on the other hand, deals (or purports to deal) with 
the fixed, the true, that is, with the merely true-that exceedingly 
thin veneer of reality where prediction, order, and rationality 
prevail. It tests itself in various forms of "logic." Rhetoric, on the 
other hand, rejects the standard of "logic" and the cogito. It tests 
itself against the views of others, against tradition, and against a 
nature that it both constitutes and discovers. Therefore, we may 
say that though there are various theories of rhetoric, 7 all share 
one common trait: they are dialogical 8 and welcome the challenge 
of give-and-take. They deal with the self and the other, the self 
and the world, the self and the past, and the self and the future. 
Other standards of reason are not dialogical. A priori reason is 
monological and shuts out the other as irrelevant. Inductive ratio 
only listens when the other responds logically, predictably, as 
modernism (pre-)figured it had the duty to do. Aufhebung, of 
course, listens too-but to echoes. That these standards have been 
preferred over the dialogical and the rhetorical is testimony to 
man's fear of the world and his escapist fascination with games, 
acrostics, and a universe ruled by Natural Law. 
It is always suspicious, of course, when one rattles an idol 
(idyl?) like Newton ( or even Einstein); and I am not suggesting that 
we reject deterministic science and return to mysticism, magic, and 
the occult. Rather, we need to recognize that Newtonian-Einsteinian 
physics applies only to one narrow segment of reality-the seg-
ment on which we, with our passion for "logic," have concentrated. 
The rest of life-a large part of physical as well as social reality-is 
not logical. In that illogical part of life, we know no more than we 
did before the scientific revolution. Indeed, because we have been 
hypnotized by science at the expense of life, we may know less. 
It may be useful, therefore, to try to recall pre-scientific wisdom. 
One example of such wisdom is the thought of Machiavelli. 
Machiavelli emphasized the positive role of man in building civiliza-
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tion and would have been astonished at the idea of applying the 
model of nature to the human order of things. In the Discourses, 
Machiavelli observed that nature was created by Heaven as the 
enemy of man. 9 The use of the word "Heaven" may seem an odd 
tum of phrase for an unbeliever, but it is plain, here and elsewhere, 
that by "Heaven" Machiavelli simply meant "chance" (caso).10 Caso 
is the cause of nature as well as of nature's freakish outbursts of 
unruly behavior. 
Opposed to the alien and mysterious "order" of nature, 
Machiavelli presented the human order of "language and religion. "11 
This was a true order of things, created on purpose by the rhetoric 
of men like Moses who, Machiavelli made clear, knew what was 
necessary to found an order of things long before he dragged in 
God as his spokesman. Casting Moses as the primal deceiver, 
Machiavelli thrust the origin of postmodernism back to about 1300 
B.C. and separated man not only from nature but from God as well. 
The human order is the creation of man; and men are ( or at least 
men like Machiavelli's Moses are) calculating, purposeful, founders 
(ordinatori) of civil order. This order is founded on man-made conven-
tions and its rulers are aided-when necessary-by man-made gods. 
Nature, on the other hand, is random, hostile, and the enemy of 
order. The idea of a "natural law" was, for Machiavelli, an absurdity, 
a contradiction in terms, like "university administration." 
Newtonian physics, of course, regards the idea that nature is 
ruled by "chance" as a bit of residual mysticism, a historical-cultural 
smudge on the transparent window through which we clearheaded 
modems can see nature's mindless machinery . Modems who wor-
ship at the shrine of an orderly nature are apt, therefore, to find a 
quaint mysticism, if not a certain craziness, in a view that thinks 
nature acts spontaneously and by "chance ." The "scientific" model, 
in short, has become the only acceptable model for knowledge of 
any kind; and thinkers who doubted its sanctity were, by the 
eighteenth century, regarded as reactionary curiosities. 
One of these curiosities was Giambattista Vico, who dismissed 
the scientific model as pure mysticism and astonished his readers 
by announcing that man could more easily come to know civil 
society than nature. To know a thing, Vico said, had nothing to 
do with measuring the thing. F = (g)M1M2/d2 does not tell us what 
gravity is (who could know that?); it simply measures the ratio of 
forces between M1 and M2 . To accept mere measurement as knowl-
edge was to settle for a cheap imitation of knowledge. The only 
way to know a thing is to have made it. We can never, for example, 
have the kind of knowledge of DNA that we have of computers 
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because we did not make DNA and do not even know why it 
was made. Man, however, did make the rules of society and the 
world of nations and so can come to know these things : 
Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers 
should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of 
nature, which , since God made it, He alone knows; and that they 
should have neglected the study of the world of nations or civil 
world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know. 12 
There, in one extraordinary (if unnoticed) sentence, Vico 
swept away the whole vision of an orderly universe patrolled by 
a rational God and ordered by a natural law. With the rejection 
of natural and divine law came as well the rejection of both divine-
right monarchy and the so-called social contract, that primordial 
powwow of fully conscious neanderthals who supposedly met, 
discovered the social corollaries of the laws of nature, and then 
wrote out a meum and tuum with their "elected" sovereign. 
In fact, said Vico, man did not discover the natural law; he 
"made" it, created it with his own language and rhetoric; and did so 
without divine or natural guidance. Then, however, overwhelmed 
with the majesty of his creation (and subdued by religion and 
philosophy), he came to believe that the natural law must have been 
communicated to him by God-or at least by a philosopher. 
Like Machiavelli, Vico saw nature as something unknowable, 
alien to man. Long before Darwin, Italian rhetors and many others 
had seen that life in the state of nature, life before man took charge, 
was simply survival of the fittest. "At the beginning of the world," 
said Machiavelli, "the inhabitants were few in number and lived for 
a time dispersed like beasts ." Likewise, Vico noted that the first 
men were "wild and savage ." And even earlier, ancients like Cicero 
had pointed out that, before the appearance of the rhetor, men 
"wandered at large in the fields like animals. "13 
The question for Machiavelli, Vico, Cicero, and the ancient 
Italians was not how to recover the law of nature-but how to escape 
it. According to these thinkers, men escaped the jungle through 
their pragmatic common sense and rhetoric. Rhetoric, common 
sense, was practical wisdom worked out in the world and not, like 
the cogito, wisdom imposed on the world. It was, moreover, common 
sense, not individual and isolated knowledge; and because it 
was common, it was tested in the world, against the wisdom of others. 
The appearance of so many Italians in this roster of thinkers 
opposing the new scientific model is not coincidental. From ancient 
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times, the Romans had turned not to Socrates and abstract 
rationalism, but to Aristophanes, to rhetorical and historical con-
texts, to the perspective of practice and ordinary language. Thus, 
Cicero, scorning abstract issues of purely metaphysical irrele-
vance, noted, against the idea of philosopher-kings and founders, 
that "orators were originally the founders and often the saviors 
of states." Moreover, where philosophy was of use to the few, 
oratory and rhetoric were written in the language of the many: 
Whereas in all other arts the highest excellence is found in that 
which is farthest from the intelligence and appreciation of the un-
learned, in oratory, it is a great fault to be out of harmony with 
the language of every-day life, and the accepted usage of men of 
ordinary taste and intelligence [ consuetudine communis sensus]. 14 
Romans, in short, were not worried about metaphysics; they wor-
ried about how to govern a republic and then an empire of citizens 
-in this world . 
Immune to the theoretical siren, Roman thought remained 
worldly, practical, and rhetorical; Machiavelli in the Renaissance 
and Vico in the eighteenth century represented attempts to reassert 
that tradition against the dominant rationalist view. Likewise, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century and especially in the fin-
de-siecle revolt against the old Newtonian science, the old humanist 
rhetorical perspective appeared in thinkers like Francesco De 
Sanctis, Benedetto Croce, Antonio Labriola, Antonio Gramsci, 
and others. Rejecting both Roman Catholic culture with its tran-
scendent God and scientific culture with its transcendent nature, 
these thinkers argued that the course of history was entirely up 
to man. Belief in the Newtonian model was a seductive fantasy 
that led men away from their proper work. Thus Croce, for exam-
ple, embodying, of course, all the fury of the fin-de-siecle revolt 
against science-but also, by now, a tradition-observed that sci-
entists would have to be put in their place if man was to see his 
true place in the maelstrom and act responsibly . 15 
The science of nature, said Croce, was a mere "pseudo-con -
cept." Man could no more know nature than he could know the 
future. Science was not, Croce said-with Kuhnian precision-the 
objective study of a necessary or fixed nature, but an arbitrary, if 
not exactly capricious, decision to arrange and study natural things 
in a particular way favored by particular disciplines. Arranging 
them so, scientists found such-and-such to be the "natural" re-
lationship . But, had they arranged things differently, they would 
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have found another relationship to be the "natural" one. 
Long before Jorge Luis Borges rocked Michel Foucault back 
on his heels with his hilariously terrifying taxonomy taken from 
a "certain Chinese encyclopedia," 16 Croce had seen the effrontery 
of a taxonomy that claimed to be "value free." Croce said that 
taxonomists, like all scientists, "choose" the way they see nature: 
To be able to choose this or that particular division (the organs of 
nutrition, or reproduction, etc., or this or that particular part of 
the organs or functions) is precisely the arbitrary element and hence 
the extraneous [element] that is introduced. 17 
To mention Borges, of course, is quite enough to make one 
wonder if anything but an arbitrary science riddled with choice 
is possible. Borges's bizarre characters not only do not think in 
our universals but, to avoid leaps of faith, do not think in universals 
at all. "The meta physicians of Tkm," says Borges, "do not seek for 
truth or even verisimilitude, but rather for the astounding" -but 
who knows, today, what is astounding? 18 
To mention the nearly blind Argentinian librarian Borges and 
his world also recalls for us the character of the nearly blind librarian 
Jorge di Burgos in Umberto Eco's Name of the Rose, that amazing 
Saussurian "labrinth," at the end of which the detective finds, by 
accident-by false reason-the murderer. By that accidental dis-
covery, Eco raises again today the question of the Italian rhetors 
as to the method of the "true." Who knows, asks Adso at the end 
of the "labrinth," if all thought is not but a "cento, a figured hymn, 
an immense acrostic that says and repeats nothing?" 19 
It is, of course, the issue raised repeatedly by Eco and others 
today. In his "Looking for a Logic of Culture," for example, Eco 
issues an ironic warning to "forget the objects of discourse" be-
cause "signs are not entities but relations; they stand for something 
else, but the problem of meaning does not concern the 'they' or 
the 'something' but the function 'standing for."' 20 
The suspicion that nature lies outside any logic is, of course, 
an idea that is now widely believed by linguists and even 
philosopher-scientists like Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and 
Ilya Prigogine; but it was raised by Italian rhetors long before 
Saussure made language a system of difference rather than iden-
tity or before Martin Heidegger and later Jacques Derrida made 
reason into tail-chasing exhibitionism. 
Eco's Burgos is interesting, however, not only because he at 
least indicates that the world is there even if we find it only by 
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accident. He is interesting also because he destroyed the only 
copy of the "lost" sections of Aristotle's poetics, the sections on 
comedy. Why comedy? Partly, no doubt, because, as Burgos said, 
laughter before the divinely fixed order was inappropriate, but 
more to the point, because comedy, even before Aristophanes 
spoofed Socrates, represented the antidote to the fixed "true" of 
philosophy and science. Comedy raised against Socrates' con-
stant, exasperating, and tail-chasing inquiry, the concrete and 
rhetorical wisdom of common sense and the ars topica, and, asked 
Socrates if he knew where his science, his philosophy was 
grounded. 21 
Such ideas, stretching back to the ancients and on through 
Machiavelli, Vico, Croce, Eco, and half a dozen others, barely 
scratch the surface of rhetoric's long opposition to fixed Socratic 
ratio. We should not, however, confuse this rhetorical rejection 
of objectivity with the modern ironic rejection of all norms and 
structures . Unlike so many modern intellectual muggers and sap-
pers, one finds in the tradition of the ancients and in the Italian 
tradition (Croce , perhaps, excepted) a belief that not only was 
something being knocked down, but something was also being 
built up. Much of today's archaeological digging seems-whatever 
its late founder may have had in mind-to be simply entertain-
ment, "you dig, man?" 
Italian rhetorical thought aimed, on the other hand, at a 
knowledge deeper than either superficial modernist and Newto-
nian theory or mere present common sense. It aimed at founding 
a pragmatic wisdom that harmonized the claims of the past with 
those of the present, the claims of the many with those of the 
few. It aimed at allowing a people to act and judge; and so it 
aimed to redeem them from the charlatans who demand "proof" 
and denounce all that cannot be "proven," all that is not universal, 
necessary, and eternal. Rhetoric is not, in short, a text to be tested 
against "proof" but against other "common senses," past and 
present. A rhetorical text must test itself in a dialogue with those 
that oppose it. A serious 
text is a network of resistances, and a dialogue is a two-way affair; 
a good reader is also an attentive and patient listener. Questions 
are necessary to focus interest in an investigation, but a fact may be 
pertinent to a frame of reference by contesting or even contradicting 
it. An interest in what does not fit a model and an openness to 
what one does not expect to hear from the past may even help to 
transform the very questions one poses to the past . Both the purely 
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documentary and the "presentist" extremes are "monological" in-
sofar as they deny these possibilities. 22 
Recent events in physical science indicate that this dialogical 
method is also gaining adherents in the hard sciences and that 
the old scientific method of "proof" is losing ground. These events 
are promising because they make a shambles of the nai:ve idea 
that nature is mindless machinery, that science is knowledge of 
the "true," and that the scientific method is the only method for 
gaining wisdom. I do not refer simply to the suspicions about 
scientific paradigms that Thomas Kuhn used to unsettle physical 
and social scientists-and finally himself 23 -but to events within 
physics itself. 
These events establish at least two things. First, nature is 
ruled in large part by unknowable forces that do not submit to 
logic or laws; and second, that the revered scientific method is 
useful only in a thin veneer of the physical universe. 
Because of these two remarkable changes, we shall see that 
nature can only be understood as an independent force with whom 
we are in a perpetual dialogue. Dialogue, moreover, is the proper 
model for all learning-for learning about other cultures, other 
peoples, the past and the present, and also about nature . 
The key to real dialogue lies in the recognition that the other 
can never be completely known or mastered. Dialogue is a mutual 
probing. Modernity, on the other hand, regards nature as simply 
complex machinery, an unlimited source of plunder and a fixed 
standard of the "true." Cutting ourselves loose from this absolute 
standard should allow man to see his real place; and, at the same 
time, make him appreciate nature as an independent force to be 
respected rather than mastered. This is not a return to mysticism; 
but a middle ground between the blind adherents of "progress" 
and some postmodern Luddites who are always ready to circle 
the wagons and head on back to the Middle Ages. 
2. PHYSICS IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF MODERNISM 
Whoever is not shocked by quantum physics has not understood it .-
Niels Bohr 
In his 1913 papers, Niels Bohr established the paradigm for 
modern quantum mechanics. These papers show the influence of 
Harald H0ffding (1843-1931), professor of philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Copenhagen and (after Kierkegaard) the most prominent 
modern Danish philosopher. H0ffding had been a friend of the 
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Bohr family and Niels' philosophy professor at Copenhagen. 24 
H0ffding had some remarkable insights. He had rejected the 
Christian implications of Kierkegaard's philosophy; but he had 
absorbed enough existential Angst to see that this world could 
never be explained by a merely rational mind. Seeing three con-
flicting sets of ideas-Kierkegaard's "fear and trembling"; Kant's 
(mostly) unknowable "things-in-themselves"; and the partial in-
sights of Auguste Comte's mathematical positivism-H0ffding 
concluded that reality must not be laid out in a single plane. 
Rather, it was a series of complementary but mutually exclusive 
dimensions. The archae that lay at the very basis of reality could 
be seen in different ways-but no one way exhausted the nature 
of the archae or excluded other perspectives. 
This idea made a great impact on Bohr 25 and appeared in his 
theory of quantum mechanics as the "principle of complementar-
ity" -the idea that the electromagnetic spectrum may, incom-
prehensibly, manifest itself as either waves or particles. The dual 
nature of matter is not easily accepted for it implies that the world 
is not a one-dimensional Newtonian "true" but a multidimensional 
Pirandellian world that no single system of thought can grasp. 
Moreover, the very idea of a universe of discrete particles ( or 
so-called "wavicles") contradicted the long-established idea of a 
continuous universe ruled by deterministic "absolute" laws. It 
inevitably meant that at least some particles would be disobedient 
and, therefore, that the laws of thermodynamics were not absolute 
but probable. Indeed, Planck, who discovered the particulate or 
discrete nature of heat, was so unnerved by the discovery that 
he spent the rest of his life trying to prove himself wrong. 
Second, Bohr noted that, in investigating the behavior of par-
ticles, one had to make choices. 26 We can, for example, measure 
the position or the momentum of a particle but not both. One 
had, in other words, as Croce was then saying, to choose. 
Bohr's work on the nature of matter also led him to another 
unnerving conclusion. Observation could not be objective. This 
was over and beyond Einstein's principle of relativity. It meant 
that not only was there no privileged, objective position, but that 
man actually altered "the true" or nature when he observed it. In 
fact, he could not see nature without altering it. With this conclu-
sion and those of others later on, the idea of a nature or "true" 
independent of the observer utterly broke down. 27 In short, as in 
a dialogue with a human, the answers we get when we interrogate 
nature depend on the questions we ask; and it is through these 
questions and answers that we construct (a) reality. This idea 
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today is called the "anthropic principle" and, according to physi-
cist John Wheeler, shows that man plays an active and never a 
neutral role in the observation/construction of nature. 28 
We could, however, also call an anthropic principle the rhetor-
ical principle. Nature, like social reality, is a product of rhetoric 
or the discursive patterns established by the scientist. Reality, 
therefore, has many dimensions and the one we examine is not 
only at the expense of others, but depends on our questions. Nature 
is not objectively "discovered." It changes its shape and responds 
differently depending on what we ask. To all of us who were 
taught that nature was a mere machine, this anthropic principle 
is shocking. "Is it," asked Banesh Hoffman back in 1947, "too 
much to swallow? Is it incredible? Is it against common sense?" 29 
Humans alter their behavior when they are observed, but 
why should a machine behave differently simply because someone 
watches it? Is there a way to access reality "objectively," transpar-
ently? The common-sense answer is, of course, that later on, with 
more sophisticated methods, we will discover the hidden variable 
and reach the "true." Experiment, however, confirms that there 
is no hidden variable. 30 By constructing one set of measures, one 
physical reality, we occult others that are-or could have been-
equally real. For instance, in order to examine a cell, biologists 
had for years stained the cell to set it apart from the others that 
surrounded it. It is the only way to see the cell. But is the stained 
cell any longer the "real" cell? How could the real cell, the "true 
cell," ever be seen? In short, observation, by its very nature, 
distorts. In fact, the idea of creating/obscuring the "true" nature of 
things in order to see at all was, as Kierkegaard and Pascal saw-to 
say nothing of Machiavelli or Gorgias-hardly new. It was simply 
swept under the rug until the birth of quantum mechanics. 
If scientists had ignored these considerations in the past, the 
anthropic principle in quantum physics was too dramatic to ig-
nore. Particles, are so delicate that an electromagnetic wave strong 
enough to make them visible not only alters them, for example, 
it destroys them. Now the scientist has a "choice" of either not 
seeing the particle at all or of destroying it. The result is that a 
particle's position has to be accepted on faith and its behavior 
calculated through the laws of probability. A "real" particle ceases 
to be the objective discrete entity or "true" pictured in classical 
physics and becomes a cloud smeared around a particular locus 
with a shape dependent on the measure employed . The idea 
seemed bizarre and impossible. After all, nature had been, since 
the 1687 Principia, the standard. What right had it to be merely 
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probable? This led Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) to his famous 
indeterminacy principle: the more we establish a particle's posi-
tion, the less we know of its momentum. 
Thus, in addition to the principle of complementarity and 
Wheeler's anthropic principle, Bohr's ideas also meant that (high 
energy) physics was no longer an absolute science of the true, 
but a "science" of the probable behavior of particles. Absolute 
laws in physics prevailed only in the Newtonian dimension .31 
It is interesting, to say the least of it, to note that the collapse 
in the belief in an absolute Newtonian science of the "true" broke 
down in physics in the wake of challenges to an absolute science 
of the "true" in social theory. That is, after the appearance of 
thinkers like Nietzsche, Sorel, Croce, Bergson, and so on; after 
the "discovery" of Kierkegaard and Pascal; and, somewhat later, 
with the appearance of Martin Heidegger, there came a new gen-
eration of physicists (Bohr, Born, Dirac, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, 
etc.) who doubted an absolute true in nature. In short, the shat-
tering of the God-given physical world and the God-given social 
world occurred at approximately the same time. 
Then a remarkable thing took place. Physicists, earlier un-
nerved by the introduction of probability and particles into 
physics, began to see in probability a restoration of the "true." 
They began, in fact, to accept quantum mechanics only when they 
saw that probability theory was not a complete and unfathomable 
randomness or what is today called, with superb (if oxymoronic) 
precision, "chaos theory." Probability represented, in short, at 
least an approximate order to things; it allowed one to ignore the 
random and the novel. Probability allowed one to whistle in the 
dark. Even with probability, however, many-including Einstein-
would not accept the new quantum mechanics. Probability was 
not precise enough for him . Einstein's God ( or was it Einstein 
himself?) did not play dice. 
With as much fear of chance as Aristotle, physicists like 
Heisenberg and Schrodinger set about taming randomness 
through probability theory. And soon a comprehensible order, a 
familiar and comforting order, the logos, emerged again in the 
statistical, if occasionally untidy, behavior of particles . Given a 
large enough sample of particles, an order could be discerned. 
Certainly, at the macroscopic level, at the level of living systems, 
we ought, therefore, to be able to ignore randomness. In fact, the 
tremendous number of particles even in microscopic systems 
seemed to allow randomness to be swept under the rug. New-
tonianism was put on the back burner as physicists then turned 
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to probability theory in order to explore the inside of the atom. 
Moreover, probability served the interests of social scientists, 
anxious to escape iron determinism and yet hungry for the merger 
of social and physical theory, hungry for the respect accorded the 
particle physicist. The belief, in short, that science was a discipline 
checked by hard nature and confirmed in the esoteric mathematics 
of probability, matrices, wave mechanics, frequency distribution, 
and so on, led nearly everyone in and out of science to hold 
science up as the epistemological model of truth. Articles in jour-
nals like the American Political Science Review began to look like 
articles in the American Journal of Physics. In the late 1950s and in 
the 1960s, social theories (behaviorist, structuralist, functionalist, 
etc.) began to require knowledge of statistics, matrices, and prob-
ability. The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan 
and various behavioralist thinkers began the search for what David 
Easton, one of the champions of the new social science, called a 
"broad gauge theory" that would, like a unified field theory, tie 
all human behavior together. 32 
Then came 1968 and the emergence in social theory of post-
structuralism. Rigidity, "norms," structures, began to appear as 
oppressive, tyrannical, "Gaullist." Ideas challenging order, even 
probable and arbitrary order, hitherto in the wings, took center 
stage. Physicists, too, began to wonder if there were not other 
dimensions beneath the probable and the deterministic. Thomas 
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions suddenly skyrocketed 
into prominence. Where Bohr and the quantum physicists had 
raised questions about the stability and, therefore, the knowability 
of nature, Kuhn raised questions about the stability of the knower, 
suggesting that his science was culture-bound. Indeed, because 
of his imprisonment in a particular culture, the scientist could 
only challenge his hypotheses from within that same paradigm. 
A really serious test would require the perspective of an "alien." 
For example, Andrew Pickering, a physicist from the Bohr Institute 
in Copenhagen and now a researcher in elementary particle 
physics at the University of Edinburgh, noted that "in the 1960s 
and 1970s constellations of neutrino experiment weak-interaction 
theory were incommensurable : the old and new theory of the 
weak-interaction were each confirmed in its own phenomenal 
domain and were each disconfirmed outside it." From this he 
concluded that "to listen too closely to scientists may be simrly 
to stifle the imagination. World views are cultural products." 3 
Kuhn's work shook the scientific community. Its implications 
were so explosive that it became required reading in virtually every 
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field, and so lent fuel to the growing revolt against the "true." 
While Kuhn raised questions about the ability of the scientist 
to develop and test theories that transcend culture, others went 
further and began to wonder if scientists had ever really bothered 
to seriously test their theories. Perhaps the theories were, like 
Adso's acrostic, mere language games. Perhaps probability had 
only been a desperate attempt to "save the appearances," the 
vestiges of the "logos." Scientific theory began to lose its luster. 
The suspicion began to grow that scientists did not aim at finding 
theories to explain reality, but at protecting their theories against 
probes by marauding enemy facts. Thus, the physicist-philosopher 
Paul Feyerabend noted in 1975 of "Von Neumann's work in quan-
tum mechanics," that the theory has become "a veritable monster 
of rigour and precision while its relation to experience is more 
obscure than ever." 34 Indeed, in Feyerabend's opinion, "no single 
theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. "35 In 
short, a theory, as Feyerabend loves to point out, is simply testi-
mony to the scientist's ability to exclude counterexamples. 
While Feyerabend and Kuhn challenged the idea that science 
was getting closer to the "true," others took a different and more 
dramatic course. Physicists like Ilya Prigogine and Mitchell Feigen-
baum, meteorologist Edward Lorenz, astronomer Michel Henon, 
biologist Robert May, mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, and 
others, began to argue that reality is not one thing, but a series 
of local "realities" -each ruled by a different "ruler" or" attractor." 
Deterministic classical physics and even probabilistic quantum 
mechanics examined only two narrow loci of reality, loci where 
systems were rather law-abiding. Beyond these areas, however, 
were other loci inhabited by large numbers of outlaws and de-
speradoes. Prigogine and the others, in short, introduced the next 
revolution in physics: examination of that vast reality beneath the 
veneer of order on which physics has concentrated since the seven-
teenth century. It is a physical reality that moderns find repugnant, 
more compatible with Machiavelli's or Vico's theory of nature 
than Einstein's. 
The science of this disorderly world is one that, since the late 
1970s, has mushroomed into prominence as scientists have more 
and more come to realize that what characterizes our world is not 
order, regularity, and periodicity, but disorder and noise-in 
short, chaos. 
To enter the world of chaos theory (Lasciate ogni speranza) is to 
involve oneself in the world of nonlinear equations, of Feigenbaum 
sequences, Lyapunov exponents, bifurcation points, "strange at-
DIFFERENT/A 106 
tractors," feedback loops, multidimensional driven dissipative 
systems, and other esoteric if not absolutely metamagical notions. 
Studying chaos is not like studying the artificially organized 
laboratory experiments of traditional physics. Pioneers in this 
spooky land are apt instead to uncover things which are closer 
to the supernatural and Kafkaesque than the natural. Thus, 
Feigenbaum discovered a universal scaling constant in periodic 
bifurcation points, and Lorenz shattered Von Neumann's dream 
of weather prediction by demonstrating how the slightest changes 
in the parameters of iterated equations could produce dazzlingly 
unforeseen events. Michel Henon, departing from traditional and 
tedious recording of periodic astronomical orbits, began tracking 
down intergalactic "strange attractors" that produced complete 
disorder as well as order. Robert May revolutionized the study of 
ecology by showing that theories of periodicity in animal reproduc-
tion completely missed far more important and chaotic demo-
graphics; Mandelbrot discovered that scaling could be a key to 
certain types of chaos; and Prigogine explored the real meaning 
of the second law of thermodynamics-and won the Nobel Prize 
for it in 1977. 
Chaos theory is complex; but the heart of it lies in its assump-
tion that from the big bang on, the world has been in disequilibrium. 
This emphasis on nonequilibrium or far-from-equilibrium studies 
separates chaos theory from classical physics and traditional quan-
tum mechanical physics; for both of these assume equilibria to be 
the norm. In nonequilibrium systems, the participants in the sys-
tem either never settle down or move randomly between one 
equilibrium and any number of others. 
This assumption of disequilibrium is warranted by the fact 
that an orderly, homogeneous, or isotropic universe is clearly not 
what we find around us. Indeed, an orderly and predictable uni-
verse would be most astonishing: galactic matter would, as the 
old cosmological principle used to hold, be evenly distributed 
rather than appearing in the uneven bubbles we see; weather 
would be absolutely predictable; chemical systems, instead of tak-
ing off with a life of their own, would never saltate-and con-
sequently evolution would not have taken place; dynamic systems 
like flowing water would run smoothly no matter how high the 
pressure; laboratory experiments would not require a fudge factor 
because life and the laboratory would be indistinguishable; sys-
tems would run forever rather than obeying the second law of 
thermodynamics and running down; matter and anti-matter 
would be equally distributed and would annihilate each other 
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(and us), and so on. In fact, as common sense (as opposed to 
science) has always held, what is most obvious about the physical 
world is how little of it is well-behaved; it is not like a clock. In 
other words, out-of-the-laboratory physics, like life, is about as 
predictable as picking the right line at the supermarket. The key 
question for physics is, therefore, not what events are regular, but 
what makes the world irregular and familiar. The answer is that 
the system is not in equilibrium. 
Concentrating on this lack of equilibrium in the universe, 
chaos theory reverses the ideas of Newton, Einstein, Bohr, et al., 
so that instead of factoring out the background noise (subsidiary 
fluctuations, static, etc.) in order to hear the periodic and regular 
functions, we factor out periodicity in order to hear the noise. 
The assumption here is that the noise is the voice of the underlying 
disequilibrium. It is precisely the noise, therefore, that is signifi-
cant, for it carries the "genetic code" of the universe. Not only 
does the noise of disequilibrium constantly feed back into the 
system and make the real world different from the laboratory, but 
it is the fact of disequilibrium that makes the world so vulnerable 
to minor events. Because the system is running constantly on tilt, 
it can react violently and unpredictably to the slightest additional 
input. Minor and random events, therefore, can produce dispro-
portional or nonlinear consequences . The classic and not al-
together frivolous metaphor is that of a butterfly flapping its wings 
in China and producing a cyclone in Kansas . Such a jolting idea, 
of course, makes evident the impossibility of prediction. More 
important, however, it points up the futility of traditional scientific 
or reductionist procedures that aim at the isolation of "real" (i.e., 
"periodic") events from the irregular, "unreal" back-
ground noise of the flapping wings. It is precisely the "epiphenom-
enal" noise of the flapping wings that burbles up through the 
system and then produces the important and dramatic result. In 
short, by concentrating on the periodic, we have found what we 
were looking for; but we have been looking for the wrong thing. 
One of the most important chaos theorists is Ilya Prigogine, 
who has concentrated on issues in far-from-equilibrium situations 
where nonlinear and random relationships are the rule. Such re-
lations, as we have seen, have traditionally been ignored by class-
ical and quantum mechanical physics because they were assumed 
to be simply part of the noise. Moreover, they involve devilishly 
difficult if not impossible nonlinear equations, equations in effect 
for what burbles up through the system as opposed to what is tidy 
and periodic. As physics moves out of the laboratory, however, 
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equations like this become necessary because the disequilibrium 
magnifies minor events in nonlinear and startling ways. 
In organic chemical processes, for example, as opposed to 
mechanical systems, almost anything can happen because chem-
ical enzymes can engage in autocatalytic or cross-catalytic relation-
ships and produce whole new systems-which can, in turn, go 
on and produce new systems themselves. By a process of saltation, 
one can, therefore, move quickly and randomly away from the 
given starting point. In demographics and many systems in 
physics where the solution to the unknown variable is fed back 
into the equation the next time it is run, the feedback loops can 
also produce exceptionally dramatic results. As Prigogine put it, 
in this area, "there is no longer any universally valid law from 
which the overall behavior of the system can be determined. Each 
system is a separate case. "36 
Prigogine is especially interested in disequilibrium and in the 
study of the uncanny outburst of patterned order that one occa-
sionally finds in the midst of chaos. He has concentrated on dis-
sipative structures, the near-magical appearance of chemical 
"clocks," Benard instability, and other fugitive systems that class-
ical and quantum mechanical physics would like to forget. Such 
phenomena concern bifurcation points or points beyond which, 
because of disequilibrium, it is impossible to predict even the 
probable course a system will take. This is the domain of the 
chaotic where both deterministic and probabilistic theory break 
down. It is the domain of eerie half-real phenomena known as 
"strange attractors," which are thought to produce or provoke 
some of the astonishing patterns that appear in and "limit" the 
chaos. 
These chaotic and astonishing events mean that beneath the 
order revealed in classical and quantum physics there are vast 
areas of nature that know no law at all. Benard instability, because 
it is merely mechanical, is a less complex example of this kind of 
freakish phenomenon. But it is illustrative. Benard instability de-
scribes a liquid system that, by increased linear inputs of energy, is 
driven from stability to instability. By rights, the system should col-
lapse. However, in defiance of the second law of thermodynam-
ics-which states that disorder can never decrease-the system 
suddenly rights itself through convection and emerges as a new 
and more orderly system-more orderly than the initial system 
was to begin with . In short, increased entropy is used for, or at 
any rate accompanied by, the spontaneous emergence of a more 
organized system! We can understand how systems, following 
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the second law, become old, wear out, and fall apart. What, how-
ever, are we to make of a system that "falls" from equilibrium into 
chaos and then into something more tightly organized than it was 
originally? It is the equivalent of a landfill suddenly reassembling 
itself as a Mercedes-Benz. It indicates something completely unex-
pected: nature can right itself, can act spontaneously on its own. 
This is not an isolated example but one of many. It is, as Prigogine 
asserts, but" another striking example of the instability of a station-
ary state giving rise to a phenomenon of spontaneous self-organi-
zation."37 
Our inclination, of course, when faced with something like 
"spontaneous self-organization" in nature, is utter amazement. 
What is out there? This is a tremendously eerie and disturbing 
event. The idea that nature can spontaneously compose and re-
compose itself at will is utter nonsense in classical and quantum 
physics. It means that we have been on a false scent in restricting 
our physics to the orderly, the "true"; and it is, in that sense, a 
shattering experience. 
It does not, however, mean that chaos theory is the only 
game in town. It means, rather, that though there is a single 
universe, it has many dimensions, one of which operates according 
to the laws of determinism, another which obeys probability 
theory, and beneath this rational surface, still another and greater 
part that fluctuates chaotically between various and unpredictable 
states. 
Moreover, it means that there are times when chaos enters 
and affects systems in equilibrium so that even there no single 
theory can ever comprehend the whole. In Prigogine's words, 
modern science, or postmodern science, indicates that there is no 
fundamental mode of description [for nature]; each level of descrip-
tion is implied by another and implies the other. We need a multi-
plicity of levels that are all connected, none of which may have a 
claim to preeminence. 38 
We can see that the nature of physics is now radically altered. 
There are reasons, good reasons, to doubt the ability of the scientist 
to transcend his cultural paradigm (Kuhn and Pickering), the abil-
ity of a theory to ever contain all the facts (Feyerabend), the sta-
bility of nature (Bohr), the universality of nature's laws (Prigogine); 
and there is convincing evidence that nature can, within limits 
established by an attractor, compose itself at will. Physics may, 
in short, no longer be conceived as simply filling in blanks in a 
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well-known machine. Nature acts spontaneously and chaotically. 
Indeed, it is the spontaneous random noise that makes our world 
familiarly non-mechanical. As Machiavelli had seen earlier, one 
of nature's fundamental characteristics is precisely caso. "Classical 
determinism," said Prigogine, "is breaking down." This is not, 
moreover, true simply of isolated exceptions or microscopic 
curiosities. Randomness is not the exception; order is. Prigogine 
noted that 
[Randomness] was believed to be of no importance for the descrip-
tion of macroscopic objects such as living systems. But the role of 
fluctuations in nonequilibrium systems shows that this is not the 
case. Randomness remains essential on the macroscopic level as 
well. 39 
As Alvin Toffler put it in introducing Prigogine's Order Out of 
Chaos, "the old universal laws are not universal at all, but apply 
to local regions of reality. "40 
The radical nature of this hypothesis is not easy to exaggerate. 
The central role of randomness in macroscopic physics means not 
only that universal laws must be replaced by local laws, but that 
in these local areas nature may alter its behavior spontaneously. 
This is a much more shattering conclusion than Kuhn's view that 
the scientist might be culture-bound. 
This emphasis on "local rule," of course, reminds one of Jean-
Frarn;:ois Lyotard's parallel observations in social theory that all 
the metanarratives have broken down. Why should the method 
of science, which is but a metanarrative, be any different? The 
"society of the future," says Lyotard, "falls less within the province 
of a Newtonian anthropology ... than a pragmatics of language 
particles. There are many different language games-a hetero-
geneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches-
local determinism. "41 
In short, patches of local order are all that exist. We have 
been using, in our social and scientific models, a model of nature 
that is local and not, as we thought, universal, eternal, and neces-
sary. The whole model of knowledge that has been built on the 
dream of objective and disinterested observation of "reality" now 
turns out to be, as Carl Becker said years ago, a "heavenly city" 
erected in place of Augustine's civitas dei by men in desperate 
search for certainty. The Newtonian and quantum mechanical 
systems do not explain everything. As Lyotard (a bit hyperboli-
cally) concludes, 
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systems theory and the kind of legitimation it proposes have no 
scientific basis whatsoever; science itself does not function accord-
ing to this theory's paradigm of the system and contemporary 
science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe 
society. 42 
Postmodern physics, in short, leads us to an appreciation of 
nature's novelty, diversity. It puts the concept of immutable uni-
versal natural laws in second place as isolated examples. 
Both at the macroscopic and microscopic levels, the natural sciences 
have ... rid themselves of a conception of objective reality that 
implied that novelty and diversity had to be denied in the name 
of immutable universal laws. They have rid themselves of a fasci-
nation with a rationality taken as closed and a knowledge seen as 
nearly achieved . They are now open to the unexpected, which they 
no longer define as the result of imperfect knowledge or insufficient 
control. 43 
This appreciation of the particular and unique at the expense 
of the universal and theoretical reminds us of Kant's ( and Croce's) 
distinction between poetry and prose, the aesthetic judgment and 
the philosophical judgment. If prose (the language of philosophy 
and traditional science) is concerned with universals (laws and 
theories), then poetry or the aesthetic is concerned with the indi-
vidual, where-as Prigogine put it-"each system is a special 
case." In short, we are led to a convergence of poetics and (post-
modern) physics. 
In the aesthetic, we have no rules given in reason or practice 
for sorting things out. Instead, we must resort to imagination and 
ingenuity, two faculties once highly regarded, but shelved in the 
scientific revolution in favor of "conceptual thinking." (Descartes' 
Rule III, for example, speaks of the "blundering constructions of 
imagination .") But, imagination deserves reconsideration; for con-
ceptual thinking applies only in areas that are logical and, as we 
have seen, even in physics, such areas are limited to surface di-
mensions. Imagination reigns in cosmology, chaos theory, high 
energy physics, microbiology, organic chemistry, and other areas 
where the spontaneous is encountered. By recognizing the large 
role that imagination plays in science, we may learn to overcome 
the shame we have been taught to feel when we admitted that 
unquantifiable imaginative thought is the central feature of prac-
tical social and political life, artistic creation, judgment, and so 
on. In short, the scientist studying phenomena like bifurcation 
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points is in about the same position as everyone else facing a 
unique situation, that is, when facing life: he must rely on his 
ingenuity. We are, therefore, brought back to Croce's conclusion 
that science is not ordained, but a matter of choice. Science does 
not have a privileged access to the "true." 
3. THE RHETORICAL MODEL 
To be in a world where knowledge is local and the knower 
is culturally localized, where the particular is the normal and the 
universal the exception, is to be in the world the rhetor considers 
normal. The rhetor knows that the true model for learning is the 
model of the orator and the auditor-each with different views 
and neither having anything to stand on other than his local 
insurance. Learning, the model for knowledge, comes from a 
recognition of mutual locality . It leads to the making of arguments, 
to a dialogue; and it is from this dialogue that "truth"-agree-
ment-is "made." The making of arguments and, therefore, of 
the true, is a product of ingenio. 
lngenio, according to Cicero and others, was the hallmark of 
the rhetor who was skilled in making auditors see extraordinary 
meanings in their ordinary language. The orator was skilled in 
using creative tropes of speech to open doors closed by habit. The 
orator, in short, had to learn to use his opponent's local language, 
his common places (loci communes), in order to lead him, to con-
vince him. Only by being aware of the other's language, the other's 
local culture, could he inspire and lead him to new and noble 
ends, for men must be led from where they actually are to where 
they could be. The philosopher, by contrast, is gifted only in the 
rarefied language of the few, of knowing where men should be, 
as opposed to where they are. The philosopher, therefore, can 
see but not lead. 
To put the rhetor in this light is to see that he is a poet; for 
the original meaning of poiesis was "making" or "creating." Post-
modern humanism is also a kind of poiesis for it requires a poetic 
willingness to venture beyond the theoretical world of the immut-
able and the logical and into the world of diversity, into the real 
world. It requires venturing from where one thinks one is, to 
where one really is and always has been. The idea of absolute 
laws is as flimsy as the idea of a presuppositionless posture. 
Everyone, humanist and scientist, must "make" judgments, 
"create" systems, and test himself in a world where logic works 
EDMUND E. JACOB/TT/ 113 
only rarely. This deconstruction of the border between art and 
science, art and criticism, however, need not lead us into a world 
without any connections, into Borges' land of Tlon, or Croce's 
fantastic a priori a posteriori. 
We are led instead into a world held together by man's rhetor-
ical patterns. Prigogine and the chaos theorists have already ac-
cepted this. They have transformed science into a form of rhetoric, 
a dialogue with a nature we can never master, a nature which is 
self-regulating and yet spontaneous and random. Large elements 
of it, in fact, act as if they were "alive." This means something 
extraordinary; it means, as Prigogine puts it, that because "the 
natural contains essential elements of randomness," we can no 
longer see matter as "the passive substance described in the mech-
anistic world view." Rather, it is "associated with spontaneous 
activity. This change is so profound that . . . we can really speak 
about a new dialogue of man with nature." 44 
This is not mysticism; and it means, Prigogine asserts in re-
markably Vichian words, that we must make "a poetical interro-
gation of nature, in the etymological sense that the poet is a 
'maker'-active, manipulating, and exploring." 45 In other words, 
we shall have to abandon the Cartesian method that requires us 
to decontextualize events and reduce them to their smallest com-
ponents. To abstract is to distort. Likewise, we shall, at this level 
anyway, have to abandon theoretical or conceptual thinking. 
This does not mean that we should return to the occult or 
turn to oracles. If, as Frederic Jameson put it, "postmodernism 
certainly means a return of all the antimodern prejudices," 46 it 
offers no succour either to those who long for the pilgrimage to 
Stonehenge or for those who love the absurd. The hope of post-
modernism is that it can regain control of technology, not erase 
it; that it can, precisely, escape the absurd and allow for a 
reemergence of humanism. Postmodern humanism's exposure of 
science as not a piecemeal discovery of the "true" but a dialogue 
with, and an acceptance of, the reality of nature, aims at restoring 
to man an ability to assert himself again, if not as an omnipotent 
despot, at least as an equal partner. 
Nature and society both emerge as partial human constructs. 
From this, we may regain some appreciation for our work. History 
and nature may be regarded as a medieval stain glass window or 
the facade of a Gothic cathedral, complex texts filled with al-
legories, symbols, and signs-anything but an uncomplicated 
machine with a single meaning. Moreover, like the church or stain 
glass, the author may be seen as man inspired with a sense of 
DIFFERENT/A 114 
the unknown. Such an author and such a text can only be known, 
and always incompletely known, through a dialogical process . A 
good scientist, like a good humanist, will learn to be a good reader 
of signs and contexts. 
Likewise, we must recognize that no dialogical perspective 
in physics or social reality can be neutral. "Relativity, quantum 
mechanics, [and] thermodynamics have shown us that nature 
cannot be described 'from the outside,' as if by a spectator. "47 
Whatever theoretical map we construct will, as Feyerabend points 
out, fall short of accurately describing reality . In Alfred Korzybski's 
apt phrase, "the map is not the territory." 
Still, that no map can ever encompass all the particulars of 
the social or physical territory does not mean that the map may 
be a free drawing . Social and physical reality must be treated as 
real compositions by real and independent persons . They cannot 
be completely known or mastered. If nature reveals herself to us 
only partially and "only through the active construction in which 
we participate," 48 so does history . Every attempt to contain either 
one of them in a single rhetorical system obscures other valid 
dimensions just as it does in the social world. 49 
Because whatever" active, manipulating, and exploring" post-
ure we adopt will both reveal and conceal reality, we can say 
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle is but a microcosm of the 
whole human perspective: the more we succumb to or adopt one 
view, the more are other views closed to us. This leads us directly 
back to notions of rhetoric in ancient thought and to the idea of 
common sense as set out by Vico. Truth is made, not discovered; 
and the concept of knowledge itself must be adjusted to account 
for the verum ipsum factum. This theory certainly indicates that the 
world is open-ended and without structure until man gives it 
shape, but this shape cannot ever be completely remade at any 
single instant or by any single individual or single culture. What-
ever posture we adopt must reconcile itself with the past, tradition, 
and nature itself. 
Feyerabend suggests a method of "counter-induction" as a 
basis for a dialogue with nature. We must, he says, search out 
the exceptions to the rules, must avoid making rules .50 We must, 
in short, drop the demand that theory encompasses all the facts 
because this inevitably leads to excluding the facts we do not like. 
Instead, we should adopt a posture that leaves us open to facts 
that do not fit. Moreover, we must recognize that 
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the material that a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his 
experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemolog-
ical prejudices, his attitude towards the absurd consequences of 
the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, 
ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background.51 
Such a course is not, of course, foolproof. It must be aware 
of the dangers on both its flanks. On the one hand, there is the 
danger of arbitrary and capricious reading; on the other, the temp-
tation to relapse into soporific "logic." Modernity, with its belief 
in the "true," should have protected us against the arbitrary, but 
did not. Indeed, its very fascination with rules and the "true" 
may have tended to push people into the capricious. Rhetoric is 
certainly not immune to the capricious either-but at least it can 
use both hands to struggle against it and is not restricted to defend-
ing itself with "logic." 
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